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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
herein to be dependent on each other, the tenant had a right to rescind the
contract for failure to perform. The question is, was there a reasonable time
given by the tenant to the landlord in the letter dated April 27, 1954. It gave
till June 30th for the landlord to comply, and it appears that this letter made
time of the essence and if it could be shown that the time was reasonable in
the light of all surrounding circumstances, then landlord breached his covenant
and tenant had a right to rescind.
INDIAN LANDS; JURISDICTION TO DETERmiNE TITLE
Section 8 of the New York Indian Law states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall settle or reside
upon any lands owned or occupied by any nation, tribe or band; and
any lease, contract or agreement permitting such residence shall be
void. The county judge of the county in which the lands are situated,
upon complaint made to him, of such illegal residence, shall if he
thinks there is reasonable ground therefore, issue a notice directed
to the person against whom complaint is made, requiring him to
appear before such judge at a time and place therein specified, to
answer the complaint. Such judge shall attend at the time and place
mentioned in the notice, and upon proof of the personal service of the
notice, shall take proof of the facts alleged in the complaint, and shall
determine whether such person is an intruder upon the lands of such
reservation. If he shall determine that such person is an intruder, he
shall issue a warrant to the sheriff of the county commanding him,
within ten days after the receipt thereof, to remove such person from
such lands. The district attorney of any county in which reservation
lands are situated, upon written application of the chiefs, councilors
or head men of the nation, tribe or band owning such lands shall
make complaint of any intrusions on such lands, and cause the
intruders to be removed.43
Does Section 8 of the Indian Law give a County Court jurisdiction to
decide right or title in land when an intruder proceeding is brought under it?
In the case of Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co.,44 a proceeding was
brought by the District Attorney of Suffolk County pursuant to Section 8 of
the Indian Law. The proceeding involved a nine acre parcel of land to which
both the Indians and appellants claimed title. There was a disputed issue of
fact as to where the boundary line of the reservation was situated. This issue
was resolved in favor of the Indians. Appellants were adjudged intruders, and
the County Court directed issuance of a warrant for their removal from the
land. The Appellate Division affirmed the order, but in its decision stated
that the order removing the appellants as intruders did not determine right or
title in the land.45 On appeal, the ruling of the Appellate Division concerning
the right or title in the land was held to be erroneous, and as a result, the
43. N.Y. INDL.%N LAW § 8.
44. 207 Misc. 114, 137 N.Y.S.2d 570 (County Ct. 1955).
49. Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 4 A.D.2d 749, 165 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2nd Dep't
1957).
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Court of Appeals 46 reversed the decision. In a four-two decision, the Court
held that the County Court did have jurisdiction, under Section 8, to decide
right or title in land. The case was then remitted to the Appellate Division
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
In order to determine whether or not appellants were intruding upon
Indian land, it was necessary for the County Court to determine the boundary
line of the reservation. The Court's jurisdiction to issue the warrant depended
upon whether the disputed parcel of land was Indian land, and it is well
settled that a court has jurisdiction to determine the facts upon which its
jurisdiction depends. 47 The Indians alleged that appellants were intruders upon
Indian land. Section 8 commands the court to determine whether such person
is an intruder, and in order to do so it obviously must determine whether the
land is in fact part of the Indian reservation. Therefore, if Section 8 gives the
Court power to do this, it does not appear to be so unreasonable or shocking in
proceeding one step further in saying that in a proceeding brought under
Section 8, the Court has the power to determine right or title in the land. In
the instant case, the County Court would have lacked jurisdiction to oust
appellants as intruders without a finding that the disputed parcel of land was,
in fact, Indian land. Title and right to possession were inseparable. In short,
the County Court, having jurisdiction of the parties and the proceeding, had
power under Section 8 to decide the issue of ownership.
It is argued that the Court has reached a decision contrary to the estab-
lished rule of New York. It is said that this decision is in conflict with that
handed down in People ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble,48 which involved a similar
proceeding under the predecessor of Section 8. This case held, that the order
of removal adjudicates upon no claim, and determines no right or title, but
leaves the removed party to the usual remedies to assert and establish any
title to the locus in quo which he may deem himself to possess. The judgment
of the Court in the Dibble49 case, did not determine right or title in the land
because there was no dispute that the Seneca Indian Nation had conveyed the
lands in question. All that case decided was, that under the treaties of convey-
ance the defendants had no right of entry onto the reservation lands until
certain conditions precedent occurred. Under the peculiar circumstances of the
Dibble case, the right to occupy the lands had not yet vested in the record
owners of the fee. Since the Indians were not obliged to surrender possession
until directed to do so by the United States government, it was possible to evict
the defendants as intruders, not withstanding the alleged title to the premises.
As stated earlier, title and right to possession, were inseparable in the case at
bar, and the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction to oust appellants as
46. Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 6 N.Y.2d 435, 190 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1959).
47. Consumers' Lumber Co. v. Lincoln, 225 App. Div. 484, 233 N.Y. Supp. 530
(3rd Dep't 1929).
48. 16 N.Y. 203 (1857).
49. Ibid.
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intruders without a finding that the disputed parcel of land was, in fact, Indian
land.
In answer to the dissent, that too broad a meaning has been given to
Section 8, it can be said that a broader interpretation has been given to the
Dibble case than that intended. Therefore, the decision of this case is not
contrary to the rule in New York, but rather, it merely gives to Section 8 the
full interpretation it was meant to have. Thus, it can be concluded that this
case does add somewhat to the prior rule by establishing the full powers of the
County Court under Section 8.
It would be an unreasonable technicality to hold that Section 8 only gives
the Court power to determine whether an individual is an intruder or not, and
that the Court does not have power in making such a determination, to deter-
mine the right and title in the land intruded upon.
EMINENT DOMAIN-DENIAL OF INTEREST PRIOR TO FILING OF CLAIM
The constitutionality of New York Court of Claims Act, Section 19, Sub-
division 1, which denies interest to a claimant for a period beginning six months
after accrual of a claim until the claim is filed,50 was upheld in La Porte v.
State.51
Title to an unimproved strip of claimants' lot vested in the State for
thruway use by an appropriation on June 1, 1953, pursuant to the New York
Highway Law Section 347, Subdivision 5-2, when a map and description of the
property was filed by the State with the County Clerk of the county in which
the property was located. A claim for compensation was filed on April 7, 1955.
Personal service on claimants was effected later in the same month. The Court
of Claims allowed interest from June 1, 1953, until the claim was filed, up-
holding the claimants' contention that a denial of interest from the end of six
months after the accrual until the claim was filed, was a failure to allow just
compensation for the appropriation and was therefore unconstitutional. 2 The
Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the claim holding that, "if nothing
occurred to bring home knowledge of taking to claimants, they had the full
use and benefit of the land during the interval and could not reasonably expect
both interest and possession."'53 The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision
affirmed on the same grounds and thereby held Section 19, Subdivision 1,
constitutional. The dissenting opinion particularly challenged the "outrageous"
twenty-two month delay in serving notice, rejected the proposition that full use
and possession are a substitute for interest where claimant has no knowledge
of the taking, argued that the New York Legislature intended a claim to
50. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 19 states:
If a claim which bears interest is not filed until more than six months
after the accrual of said claim, no interest shall be allowed between the
expiration of six months from the time of such accrual and the time of
the filing of such claim.
51. 6 N.Y.2d 1, 187 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1959).
52. La Porte v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 419, 159 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
53. La Porte v. State, 5 A.D.2d 362, 172 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1958).
